When we describe time, we often use the language of space (The movie was long; The deadline is approaching). Experiments 1-3 asked whether-as patterns in language suggest-a structural similarity between representations of spatial length and temporal duration is easier to access than one between length and other dimensions of experience, such as loudness. Adult participants were shown pairings of lines of different length with tones of different duration (Experiment 1) or tones of different loudness (Experiment 2). The length of the lines and duration or loudness of the tones was either positively or negatively correlated. Participants were better able to bind particular lengths and durations when they were positively correlated than when they were not, a pattern not observed for pairings of lengths and tone amplitudes, even after controlling for the presence of visual cues to duration in Experiment 1 (Experiment 3). This suggests that representations of length and duration may functionally overlap to a greater extent than representations of length and loudness. Experiments 4 and 5 asked whether experience with and mastery of words like long and short-which can flexibly refer to both space and time-itself creates this privileged relationship. Nine-month-old infants, like adults, were better able to bind representations of particular lengths and durations when these were positively correlated (Experiment 4), and failed to show this pattern for pairings of lengths and tone amplitudes (Experiment 5). We conclude that the functional overlap between representations of length and duration does not result from a metaphoric construction processes mediated by learning to flexibly use words such as long and short. We suggest instead that it may reflect an evolutionary recycling of spatial representations for more general purposes.
Introduction
Central to human sophistication is the ability to engage in abstract thought-thought about things that we cannot directly perceive with our senses. Consider the ability to reason about time. The experience of time is fundamental-as Robert Ornstein (1969) has remarked, ''. . .time is one of the continuing, compelling, and universal experiences of our lives, one of the primary threads which combine in the weave of our experience." Yet there is no bodily organ specialized for temporal representation, nor any physical process in the world that gives rise to its experience. A challenge for cognitive science is to characterize the representations that underlie our experience of time and account for how they arise over evolution and ontogenesis.
The study of the nature and origin of abstract concepts has often taken representations in the domain of timeconsidered by many to be an example of an abstract domain par excellence-as a test case (e.g., Boroditsky, 2000 Boroditsky, , 2001 Casasanto, 2008; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Gentner, Imai, & Boroditsky, 2002; McGlone & Harding, 1998) . Some clues to the representation of time come from language. Linguists have noted that when we talk about temporal experience (and our experiences in other abstract
